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Article 13

Euthanasia and Natural Law
James G. Colbert, Jr., Ph.D.

The author, a previous contributor to Linacre, is a professor in the
philosophy department of Boston State College.
The subject of euthanasia seems to be confused 1 even to the point
where some authors in the past have understood it to mean dying in
the state of grace.
Usually, euthanasia means mercy killing, that is the deliberate
taking of a human life to end suffering, although the term sometimes
is extended to killing others such as newly born children who are
profoundly retarded.
I will maintain that in a natural law perspective, at least in the
tradition of Thomas Aquinas, euthanasia is always wrong. I would also
suggest that killing terminally ill patients cannot be separated in principle from killiJ?g other persons; that is to say, although the issue can
be discussed in regard only to the terminally ill, whatever principle
governs the terminally ill is likely to be applied to others. Finally, I
would like to draw the implications of the principles governing euthanasia as they clarify the ethics of treatment and non-treatment of the
terminally ill, which is sometimes wrongly associated with euthanasia.
The Wedge
Let us consider the second point first: when stated as the proposition that euthanasia is wrong because it will be extended to others
than the terminally ill, it is called the wedge argument. The argument,
when it concedes that killing of the terminally ill may be acceptable in
itself but becomes unacceptable because of its consequences, is philosophically weak. As Cahill points out " . . . each act must be judged
right or wrong primarily in itself and only secondarily in its relations
to other acts ... the range of effects of an act cannot be extended
indefinitely . .. . "2 This criticism can be seen as a variant on the principle of double effect.
A good instance of this type of wedge argument might be the
reasoning advanced a decade ago by some Catholic writers to the
effect that if all legal constraints on contraceptives were dropped and
the latter became universally available, there would be a move to
legalize abortion. While both the writers in question, and, as it turned
out, some advocates of population limitation, saw abortion as another
step in the same direction (of denying the purpose of the family or of
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controlling the demographic explosion), there is certainly a clear qualitative difference in the methods and their moral implications.
Joseph Fletcher, who favors voluntary euthanasia of the terminally
ill as well as involuntary euthanasia of monstrosities at birth and
mental defectives, but not involuntary euthanasia of all who are a
burden on the community,3 makes a point of rejecting the wedge
argument in his defense of voluntary euthanasia. Fletcher recalls
Chesterton's remark that the proponents of euthanasia are likely to
broaden the object of their concerns from those who are a nuisance to
themselves to those who are a nuisance to others.4 He dismisses this
line of argument with the observation that it hangs on vague concepts
such as weakening our moral fiber and the importance of life. Ironically, part of Chesterton's point was, no doubt, the vagueness of the
concepts which justify euthanasia. This is not to say - given the intensity of Chesterton's feelings about suicide - that he would have
proposed the wedge argument in the sense of regarding the killing of
the terminally ill as something acceptable. Surely, elucidating a philosophical principle operative in one case, through its consequences in
others, is as old as the dialectic of Plato. Surely, there is a heuristic
intent in linking voluntary euthanasia to involuntary euthanasia, if the
same principle is understood to be operative in each case.
Chesterton in his polemic on another issue, sets forth a defense of
the wedge argument: "And these people (i.e., his opponents who
favored eugenics) most certainly propose to be responsible for a whole
movement after it has left their hands. Each man promises to be a
thousand policemen. If you ask them about how this or that will
work, they will answer, 'Oh, I would certainly insist on this'; or 'I
would never go so far as that'; as if they could return to this earth and
do what no ghost has ever done quite successfully - force men to
forsake their sins. Of these it is enough to say that they do not
understand the nature of a law any more than the nature of a dog. If
you let loose a law, it will do as a dog does. It will obey its own
nature, not yours. Such a sense as you have put into the law (or the
dog) will be fulfilled."5
What is therefore at issue is whether the principle involved in voluntary euthanasia can be contained just in that situation. That is what
Cahill, who is not only more cautious than Fletcher, but develops a
different set of arguments, tries to do. Fletcher justifies euthanasia
because, "Incurable pain destroys self-possession and disintegrates personality .... "6 He quotes with approval the final words typed by a
woman dying of cancer, who committed suicide, explaining that this is
a fundamental right "when all usefulness is over, when one is assured
of an imminent and unavoidable death."7 Cahill declares that for the
terminally ill patients there comes a point when " ... his or her life is
past the point of possible restoration to a quality which would sup-
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port significant pursuit of the highest human values"8 ; when" ... it is
impossible to continue to pursue human values for which the Creator
intended life to serve as the condition."9 Or again, "Life can fail to
constitute a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of human
values .... " 10 The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics defines euthanasia as a theory that justifies killing a person "in certain circumstances, when owing to disease, senility or the like, a person's life has
permanently ceased to be either agreeable or useful. ... " 11
I have quoted at some length from Cahill as well as Fletcher to
suggest that both incur in the same danger or ambiguity underlined by
the Encyclopedia. There are all sorts of people whose lives are not
useful or agreeable, besides the terminally ill. There are cases other
than terminal illness where personality disintegrates, where all usefulness is over, let alone where the quality is lacking which would support significant pursuit of the highest human values. There are lives
other than those of the terminally ill which do not constitute sufficient
condition for the fulfillment of human value. In other words, Fletcher
and Cahill are not convincing in showing that the wedge argument is
invalid. Their philosophical rationales would not seem to justify the
restrictions they wish to place on the subjects of euthanasia.
This ambiguity is further reflected when involuntary euthanasia is
discussed, whether directly or by implication: cases such as the irreversibly comatose, the almost unconscious, or more generally the
incompetent patient. Without rejecting involuntary euthanasia, many
authors retreat from it in the context of a discussion of how to frame
a euthanasia law, where they choose to discuss voluntary euthanasia.
Fletcher sees the restriction of euthanasia to those who are presently
able to consent as a kind of political concession. One author remarks,
"My own appraisal, however, is that guardians are not legally obliged
to follow prior instructions in assessing an incompetent patient's best
interest." 12 Cantor apparently means that the family (say) could
reverse a comatose patient's request to be killed, but it would seem
that once the guardian's authority were established, it would cut both
ways. Hence, the tendency to skirt the issue of involuntary euthanasia
may itself be a tacit concession of the cogency of the wedge argument.
On the one hand, the patient who is comatose is past pain, beyond
despair, and does not, it seems to me, die with more dignity sooner than
later. His case is different from that of the person overwhelmed with
pain, unless one sees them both as instances of valueless life. On the
other hand, the advocates of euthanasia who make their judgments in
terms of quality of life, are hardly in a position to give a principled (as
opposed to tactical) rejection of involuntary euthanasia because that
would be valuing less the continued life of someone still able to make
choices than that of someone unable to make choices.
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The heart of the case for euthanasia is the situation of the agonizing
terminally ill patient. Even here, it is odd in a way that Fletcher
chooses as an example Dean Jonathan Swift whose final illness lasted
eight years. At what point were his attendants supposed to have
known that his end was near? At what point should they have allowed
Swift, always a morbid personality, to seize a knife or poison? And is
this not a case where modem pharmacology would probably have
eased the agony?
The wedge argument, some versions of which are philosophically
inadequate, is a favorite weapon of such strong opponents of euthanasia as the Sass ones 13 and Paul Marx. 14 In fairness to publicists such
as the Sassones and Marx, however, it must be pointed out that they
do not concede that killing of the terminally ill is licit in itself,
becoming illicit through its consequences; hence they do not propound the wedge in the objectionable form. They are trying to teach,
to make a social and political argument. As the Sassones point out, the
wedge argument is a mainstay of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
on matters relating to free speech and religious liberty.15 On this
level, it becomes quite appropriate to introduce considerations such as
the anguish of many patients, their possible distrust of physicians if
euthanasia is legalized. The wedge argument is hardly novel, and as an
empirical prediction applied to euthanasia, it may well be true (I
believe it is), however infelicitous it sounds if read as a rigorous philosophical statement.
Aquinas
It has been suggested that there is a natural law basis for euthanasia
in Thomistic anthropology, which Aquinas inconsistently did not see.
The positive explanation of the sanctity of life is, according to this
critique, contained in the principle of totality which on the one hand,
involves the subordination of the parts of the body to the health of
the whole, but on the other, " ... as it is actually used by Catholic
theologians and writers on medical ethics, includes the subordination
of the physical aspect of man to the whole 'person' which also includes his spiritual aspect." 16 "Consequently, it would seem most
inconsistent for any theologian (i.e., in the Thomistic tradition) ... to
interpret moral dilemmas according to a principle of human totality
which neglects not only man's supernatural goal, but his natural goal
of mature integration of body and spirit. "17

On the other hand, it seems rather odd to invoke precisely the
principle of totality to justify separating body and soul. 1S For what it
is worth, the person - man - is a union of body and soul according to
Thomas. 19 What we actually have, I think, is a justification of sacrificing the body for the good of the soul, so that the statement of Thom-
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istic anthropology is somewhat muddled.
In any case, St. Thomas knew no science called anthropology,
although one may reconstruct a philosophical anthropology from his
works, but did know a science of ethics, and it is on this plane that we
must deal with euthanasia.
It ought to give pause that St. Thomas who employs the principle
of totality to justify amputation of an ailing member for the health of
the whole organism and indicates that a wise doctor may allow a
patient to incur a lesser infirmity to cure a greater disease,20 nevertheless declares that it is never licit to mutilate oneself for one 's spiritual
good, e.g., by castration, even though spiritual health is more important than bodily health. 21 It is wrong to kill oneself to avoid sin. 22
More fundamentally, the principle of totality would be inapplicable in
matters relating to human life since Aquinas reiterates that man is not
ordained to himself as a totality but to something outside of himself.
Our last end is not something of man. 23

The governing principle in St. Thomas is that it is never licit to kill
the innocent. 24 More specifically, suicide is always a mortal sin (a
concept to which we will return later). This is so firstly, because by
nature each thing wishes to conserve itself and self-destruction goes
against charity to oneself. Furtherm:ore, we injure the community of
which we are part by killing ourselves. Thirdly, we arrogate to ourselves a divine prerogative and sin against God, Who is Lord of life and
death. 25 The three points are not independent. The third is easiest to
emphasize, because the second wrongly understood lends itself to a
pragmatic interpretation, and rightly understood requires a comprehension of the first reason, which in turn is put in perspective by the
third.
The central issue, then, is that life is a gift of God. It belongs to
God in a special sense.26 Death, Aquinas says, is the most terrible of
things, the final evi1.27 These phrases are taken from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.28 Now, Aristotle is talking about facing death
bravely and nobly. It is possible to read his words psychologically
although it is equally clear that the psychological reaction to death has
a real justification. Whereas Aristotle's brave man should overcome
this fear, the suicide contemplated by St. Thomas clearly does not fear
death. Nor would St. Thomas agree that "nothing is thought to be any
longer good or bad for the dead." The appropriation of Aristotle's
phrases is thus a way of saying that human life is an absolute.
True, there are certain situations in which it is licit to kill, but
Aquinas does not view those cases with enthusiasm. He is at pains to
point out that Christ (Who as God had dominion over life and death)
did not kill Himself, although He did not impede His death. His persecutors were the sufficient cause of His death. 29 A cleric may not
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make war although the war is licit. 30 A cleric may not kill evildoers. 31 A man who has sentenced someone to death - properly and
justly it is understood - is irregular, that is, he may not be ordained a
priest. 32 Indeed, this irregularity follows even if a person kills in self
defense without intending to kil1. 33
This last point is worth insisting upon: in the much more significant
case of killing in self-defense, one is not supposed to try to kill; this is
held legitimate only for someone acting in a public function (e.g.,
judge, executioner). One may use only as much force as is necessary
even to defend one 's own life, although one is not required to be
overly cautious in defending one 's life. It must be remembered that
this (along with the controlling principle that it is never licit to kill an
innocent person) is the precise context in which St. Thomas makes the
point that an action may have two effects, self-defense and killing an
attacker, which is licit because only self-defense is intended. 34
There is no way on earth to read a justification for euthanasia into
that article of the Summa. Indeed it is word chopping to suggest that
there is more than one effect when one kills someone to end his
suffering. (On the other hand, clearly, the principle of double effect
does apply when pain suppressing drugs are administered with the
knowledge that they may shorten the life of the greatly weakened
terminal patient; this is obvious, among other reasons, because we
would do approximately the same for a non-terminal patient.)
When we speak of absoluteness, we are using what for St. Thomas is
a logical category. 35 Normally St. Thomas does not employ that category in expressing moral judgments. He does tell us that the first
principles of natural law are altogether unchangeable. 36 The precepts
of the Commandments are absolutely not subject to dispensation.3 7 That is the language of moral absolutes. Most often, absolute
moral values are formulated negatively.38 They are, of course, referred to as mortal sins, things one simply should not do, although
some sins are worse than others. Since the primary factor that specifies morality of an action is its object,39 it is most un-Thomistic to try
to distinguish between moral evil and, say, the action of killing an
innocent person. 40 Notice, we are talking about killing, not about
avoiding death. The absolute obligation is to not murder. Nowhere in
Aquinas (or any other medieval) is there the slightest suggestion that
there is an absolute obligation to avoid death, which is impossible to
begin with, and in many instances wrong.
There is no question that there is a serious obligation to preserve
one's life insofar as that is possible. This is held to be right and
normal. 41 If God is Lord of life and death, it would seem necessary at
some point to accept the advent of one's death, even if death is only
regarded as a punishment.42
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Ordinary and Extraordinary Means
Since, as St. Thomas judiciously notes, unlike lawyers who should
not defend desperate (because unjust) cases, doctors may earn great
praise by taking desperate cases,43 the question arises as to what are
the limits of responsibility of the doctor in regard to treatment of the
terminal patient. The general framework within which this question is
asked is that it is never licit to kill an innocent person; life is to be
conserved; but death at some point may be accepted as the will of
Providence.
There is in any case a qifference between failing to treat and killing.
At worst, leaving stolen goods where they have been hidden by the
thief is not the same as stealing them, nor is failing to help a person
being attacked the same as attacking. Thus, it is mistaken to equate
not treating or discontinuing treatment with euthanasia. Of course, a
policeman would have a specific duty to report the stolen goods or to
intervene in an assault, and a physician ordinarily has a specific
responsibility to treat his patients; some of the limits of this responsibility are our present concern.
The most typical way of solving the problem of what treatment is
obliged and when treatment may be withheld, is to use the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means. In my comments in the
August, 1977 Linacre Quarterly I suggested that this distinction may
not be helpful because it depends too much on technical progress in
medicine.
That is not to say that the distinction involves only a) the technical
aspects of medical practice as opposed to rate of success, expense, and
comfort; or b) just applies to medical ethics. The distinction is one
that affects prudential judgments fairly generally, whether they be
about the preservation of life or not. For example, it is a sensible
precaution to make sure the doors are locked at night, and it is the
responsible thing to do. It would be an extraordinary step to insure
safety to barricade the door with furniture. It is extraordinary because
it is both a nuisance and not necessary for the goal of personal safety.
Now, what is ordinary and extraordinary may vary according to circumstances. In Boston one is well advised to leave one's car locked,
and I would expect a friend to whom I lent my car to recognize his
obligation to do so. By contrast, relatives who live in New Hampshire
tell me that their neighbors regard the habit of automatically locking
cars as a quirk of people from Massachusetts. It does not take much
imagination to realize what is the source of this difference in standards
for prudent behavior, nor does it require a great effort to adjust to the
different situations.
There is in fact a peculiarity of Massachusetts law which is a factor
in the greater theft rate in Massachusetts: most auto thefts are only
misdemeanors. But it is not necessary to understand anything at all
May, 1978
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about law to know that auto theft is a problem and to try to avoid it.
Thus it is neither a novelty nor a refinement of the ordinary-extraordinary means concept to include difficulty and mutability as factors, but in medicine the situation is rather complicated, if the accent
is placed on the means of treatment and we try to involve the patient
and/or family in the decision. One of the peculiarities of medicine is
that the means of treatment may become ordinary, or cease to be
ordinary, due to improvements in the state of the art.
In the normal run of things, cost will tend to be tied to new technical developments. If we consider cost per se as a determinant of
extraordinariness (as some seem to do, perhaps to humanize what
otherwise would be a technical decision), apart from reducing the
issue to a macabre discussion of who has how much health insurance,
we enter into a different order of things. The cost factor is not pertinent to the quality of the means, but to the possibility of using them.
At the extreme, no one is held to the impossible, so the authors who
listed excessive cost as a justification for omitting treatment may have
been right, but for the wrong reason. It is, for instance, conceivable
that someone would be unable to afford a hospital bed, but it makes
no sense to say that hospitalization thereby becomes an extraordinary
means of treatment.
Excessive pain is also offered as a determinant of extraordinariness,
which is a similar confusion of orders. Besides, the degree of pain may
not be at all related to proximity to death. Most important, if one
may simplify, pain is most unbearable precisely when it is indefinite.
The pains of childbirth are sometimes intense, but they are finite, and
there is a point to them.
Now this last factor, which appeared in some of the common sense
examples, namely reasonableness and relation to goal, may give us
some clarification, particularly by comparison to difficulty. Consider
the following cases: is a patient obliged to curtail all activities for
several weeks to get the rest necessary to recuperate from hepatitis? Is
a patient with skin cancer obliged to undergo radiation treatments to
make sure that no traces are left of an extirpated tumor? Is a critically
ill cardiac patient obliged to undergo heart transplant? Is a patient
with bone cancer obliged to try Laetrile? It seems to me that the
answer to the first two questions is "Yes" and to the second two
"No." Expense may not be a factor at all and bears no consistent
relation to obligation. Inconvenience is not a consistent factor: if
Laetrile were legalized and readily available, it could be easily taken,
whereas radiation treatments can be nauseating. The obligation, then,
stems not from difficulty or expense but from the reasonable expectation of cure. Laetrile is not recommended by competent medical
authority, and heart transplants are notoriously risky. One could thus
consider them extraordinary remedies, but it seems simpler to speak
of their relationship to a cure. Now, in my two examples of non-oblig-
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atory (or extraordinary) treatment, the lack of purpose in employing
the remedies lies primarily in the defect of the remedies, but it would
seem that there might be the same sort of lack of purpose and hence
non-obligatoriness due to the nature of the illness.
If the physician could say to a patient, "You have a 98% chance of
dying within two weeks with such and such methods but a 95%
chance of dying in two months with these other methods, many
patients would see no obligation of accepting the new treatment (or
the old one), quite rightly, I believe. Of course, no doctor can make a
prediction with that kind of accuracy, but in couching remarks more
cautiously, the message may change in tone. Does not the script often
sound thus? "No one can be sure when any of us will die (which is not
the point), but we feel your chances are very slim (in reality the
speaker is convinced they are nil); there is the possibility of using this
new treatment, although we can't promise that it will cure you (in fact
we don't think it will)." The patient is thus effectively misled. 44

The reluctance of the physician to use the same frankness with a
patient that he would with another physician is understandable.
Bearers of bad news are not welcome. Physicians are not alone in
facing a situation that in much lesser degrees confronts a lawyer who
must tell his clients they have no case or even a college professor who
must tell a student he is not a prospect for graduate school. Perhaps
some of the weight would be taken off the physician 's shoulders if we
could think as Aquinas surely would have, not in terms of the patient's right to hear the truth, but of his responsibility to hear the
truth.
Some of this may sound presumptuous coming from a non-physician but Kubler-Ross remarks on the difficulties many doctors
encounter in accepting the terminal illness of their patients 45 and the
consequent defense or coping mechanism of ordering unnecessary
treatments or tests,46 which, given the state of malpractice suits, is
not a purely subjective concern.
Is the discontinuation of treatment the same as refusal of treatment? This is basically a technical question. One may wonder whether
intervention does not influence a situation creating a dependency that
did not originally exist. So it is in the case of persons who have
become dependent on a drug; so it occurs in the case of a government
program. If it can be shown that a treatment has altered the patient's
ability to function autonomously by creating a dependency, it would
seem to me that there would probably be an obligation to continue
the treatment. Otherwise, the treatment may be discontinued under
the same strictures by which it might have been initially refused. An
example, I think, would be the respirator, which should be seen probably as a device to restore normal functioning (in the manner of
mouth to mouth resuscitation) and may be discontinued as soon as
May, 1978
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the physicians are convinced that autonomous brain and heart functions will not be stimulated. 4 7
There remains the case of the terminal patient afflicted with an
unrelated curable disease. Does this new disease have to be treated
even if the patient is already considered incurable, in the light of what
has been said? My feeling is that in principle one should apply the
standard remedies; the ordinary-extraordinary distinction will be welcome here. In practice, e.g., the case of an extremely weak, elderly
patient with pneumonia, the difficulty may be to determine what
illness is unrelated. 48
Conclusion
Accordingly, four points remain with us.
1. It is quite legitimate to worry about the consequences of legalizing euthanasia. It is logical to wonder to what point a principle
will be extended once established.
2. Euthanasia cannot be justified on Thomistic principles. One may
agree with Joseph Fletcher: "Just as we have found that it is
necessary to lay aside the notion of natural law and soul because they stand in the way of ethical medical care, so we may
find that we have to lay aside the notion of man, about whom so
many reactionary, dogmatic, and absolute claims are being
made." 48 But Fletcher speaks for a different world view from
Aquinas.
3. On Thomistic principles, as one respects life, so also one accepts
death and the analysis of which means preserving life are morally
necessary and which are not, falls within that general framework.
(To suggest that recognizing an absolute value in life in a Thomistic sense, would require that one use all imaginable means to
conserve life, is a caricature.)
4. A great deal of what is written above is very brave words. I am in
no hurry to deliver or receive some of the messages about death,
which have just been declared mandatory. Some of what is written here may have a ring of harshness.
Here some perspective may help. Our age values mercy, to its
great merit. This makes us sensitive to certain arguments on behalf of euthanasia. Euthanasia is, nevertheless, wrong. Other ages
valued honor and dignity, to their great merit. That made them
vulnerable to claims of vengeance or dueling. Dueling and private
vengeance are also wrong.
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